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Abstract—
Monitoring the activity on an IEEE 802.11 network is useful for
many applications, such as network management, optimizing de-
ployment, or detecting network attacks. Deploying wireless sniffers
to monitor every access point in an enterprise network, however,
may be expensive or impractical. Moreover, some applications may
require the deployment of multiple sniffers to monitor the numer-
ous channels in an 802.11 network. In this paper, we explore sam-
pling strategies for monitoring multiple channels in 802.11b/g net-
works. We describe a simple sampling strategy, where each channel
is observed for an equal, predetermined length of time, and consider
applications where such a strategy might be appropriate. We then
introduce a sampling strategy that weights the time spent on each
channel according to the number of frames observed on that chan-
nel, and compare the two strategies under experimental conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
As IEEE 802.11 “Wi-Fi” networks become an integral
part of many enterprises and organizations, it becomes
increasingly important to monitor these networks for evi-
dence of problems, attacks or breakdowns. With such net-
works being used for critical services such as VoWLAN
(Voice over Wireless Local Area Networks), any such
breakdown or attack could have a serious effect on an or-
ganization’s productivity.
Most WLANmeasurement studies, e.g., [5], [15], [10],
have monitored the wired side of Access Points in an in-
frastructure WLAN using SNMP, syslog and packet sniff-
ing. These techniques enable the monitoring of traffic that
has been bridged from the wireless side to the wired side
of a network. They do not, however, allow us to gather
MAC layer data from the wireless side of the network,
data that might contain valuable information regarding
misbehavior or attacks. In particular, it is impossible to
detect wireless (layer 2) attacks, or problems that only af-
fect the wireless side of the network.
To effectively troubleshoot a wireless network, it is
therefore necessary to monitor the wireless side of the
network as well. This can be achieved by deploying wire-
less “sniffers”: measurement devices with 802.11 radios
placed in “monitor” mode. Such radios will record every
802.11 frame that they hear.
Monitoring all of the traffic on the wireless side of an
enterprise WLAN, however, can be expensive and diffi-
cult to set up. Since each sniffer’s radio has a limited
range, one might require as many sniffers as access points
in the network. Additional sniffers might be required if
the purpose is to monitor areas that have bad coverage.
The cost of this large number of sniffers might be pro-
hibitive.
Even if sufficient sniffers are deployed, the spectrum
used for 802.11 networks is divided into several chan-
nels. For instance, 802.11b/g divides the 2.4GHz spec-
trum into 14 channels spaced 5MHz apart.1 Thus to mon-
itor all of the potential 802.11b/g traffic in the area of a
particular sniffer might require 14 different radios. Snif-
fers with multiple radios, such as the Porcupine from In-
diana University [2] are large and may be difficult to de-
ploy on a large scale. Moreover, storing or transmitting
captured frames from 11 simultaneous channels may be
problematic, with each sniffer capable of capturing almost
600Mbps of traffic (assuming 11 channels at maximum
802.11 link-layer rates).
Rather than deploy multiple-radio sniffers, it might be
more cost effective to use single-radio sniffers that peri-
odically sample each of the available channels. At any
given time, there may be traffic on any of the 802.11b/g
channels, and a radio could cycle through these channels,
capturing some traffic on one channel before moving on
to another.
The simplest way to sample the channels would be to
spend an equal amount of time on every channel. If, how-
ever, there is no traffic on some channel, it would be
wasteful to spend equal time on that channel. Further-
more, to spend time T/n, where T is total cycle time and
n is number of channels, on channels that have a small
share of traffic may also be wasteful. On the other hand,
for particular applications it might be useful to spend time
on underutilised channels, for instance for detecting rogue
access points that may be “hiding” in lesser-used chan-
nels.
Some aspects of wireless monitoring have been stud-
ied in the literature (see Section VI). Yeo et al [16] de-
scribe an infrastructure for wireless monitoring. The au-
thors identify three challenges of wireless monitoring as
1In the USA, the FCC only allows the use of channels 1 to 11, and we
only consider those channels in this paper.
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Capacity of each Sniffer, Sniffer Placement and Data Col-
lection. We would like to add Sampling Strategies as an-
other challenge.
In this paper, we describe a sampling method whose
parameters can be adjusted to meet the needs of vari-
ous applications. This paper is laid out as follows. In
Section II we describe different metrics for evaluating
the performance of a sampling strategy. Section III out-
lines some applications that require different sampling
strategies. Section IV defines one specific strategy, and
some experiments using this strategy are presented in
Section V. Section VI discusses related work, and Sec-
tion VII lists future extensions to this work.
II. METRICS
To determine a sampling strategy, the relative impor-
tance of a particular channel in relation to other channels
needs to be quantified. The importance of a channel may
vary with time and depends on the goals of the applica-
tions. This concept is similar to the concept of bandwidth
demand and there are techniques that fairly allocate band-
width among flows [7]. The importance of a channel may
also be thought of as the “monitoring demand” from that
channel. Since this demand may not be known in ad-
vance, we may have to estimate the monitoring demand
on the various channels using historical data.
This “demand” metric may vary from application to ap-
plication. In the simplest case, the demand may be shared
across all channels, and so an appropriate sampling strat-
egy would be to spend equal time on each channel. In this
case, we are sampling the amount of time spent on each
channel, and using this to determine the amount of time
to be spent on each channel in the next round (although
in this case the intervals are equal). We refer to this as
an Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy. In another ex-
ample, the metric may be the Frame Count on the channel
(an Equal/Frame Count/Frame Count strategy).
We may also use this metric to determine a sampling
strategy that divides time among the channels in the
same proportion as the observed relative frame counts
on different channels. We refer to this as a Propor-
tional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy, as we are
using the Frame Count to determine the amount of Time
on each channel. To know the frame count, we must sam-
ple the channel first (in some simple and fair manner).
As the traffic volumes on various channels will vary with
time, we must periodically update relative frame count
proportions that are used to determine the sampling strat-
egy.
Another metric, also time varying, may be the num-
ber of clients on a particular channel (a Propor-
tional/Time/Client Count sampling strategy). Other
metrics include the number of attacks on some channels,
number of legitimate access points, or the proportion of
vulnerable or important traffic (such as VoIP) in relation
to total traffic on some channels. Another sampling strat-
egy could be to remain on a particular channel for as much
time as is required to capture n frames, or to observe m
clients. These techniques may be useful in “characteriza-
tion” applications.
III. CHANNEL SAMPLING APPLICATIONS
There are many applications of wireless monitoring
and more specifically, channel sampling. Monitoring
may be used for enabling security, management, char-
acterization, and deployment of 802.11b/g wireless net-
works. Different applications may require different sam-
pling strategies; we now discuss some of these.
A. Security
The shared nature of wireless networks introduces
many security risks and potential attacks, such as denial
of service, man-in-the-middle frame injection attacks, or
eavesdropping (see the literature for discussion of several
802.11 attacks [6], [9]). One method for detecting these
attacks is to capture all frames and recognize particular
attack signatures [8]. Another mechanism is to detect the
effect of the attack on the network, such as looking for
clients that obtain unfair bandwidth allocation [12].
These detection methods may benefit from different
kinds of sampling strategies. A signature-based detection
technique that depends on capturing every frame of an
attack may require continuous monitoring of a particular
channel. On the other hand, some attacks, such as those
that require flooding, may still be detected even if a chan-
nel is sampled.
Some attackers may wish to attack channels that have
maximum traffic volume, while others may be motivated
to attack channels with high numbers of clients. Sampling
strategies that give higher weight to such channels may be
of particular use.
It is important to note that if an attacker knows the
monitoring system’s sampling strategy, the system is vul-
nerable to the attacker modifying his or her behavior to
evade observation. For example, if the attacker knows
that the sampling strategy being used is any kind of Pro-
portional/Time Counting sampling strategy, the attacker
may introduce traffic on some channels and attack the re-
maining channels. To circumvent this attack the sampling
strategy should involve some random behavior.
B. Management
Problems in wireless networks do not result solely from
attacks. There might be RF holes, connectivity problems
or authentication problems that a network administrator
needs to discover as soon as they occur. Adya et al dis-
cusses a management infrastructure that depends on wire-
less monitoring by clients [4]. A smart sampling strategy
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could be used to augment the management techniques de-
scribed in that paper.
Network managers may wish to monitor the channels
to determine QoS being provided to VoIP calls. The sam-
pling metric could be based on the proportion of VoIP
traffic.
C. Characterization
Characterizing wireless networks is useful for improv-
ing wireless protocols, simulating wireless networks, de-
veloping new mobile applications and so forth. Accurate
characterization of wireless networks relies on accurate
measurement, and so sampling strategies may prove use-
ful. Sampling can increase the geographic channel cover-
age of sniffers, and reduce the expense of deploying mul-
tiple sniffers, one for each channel.
Enterprise wireless networks are becoming increas-
ingly sophisticated, with access points that can automati-
cally alter their power levels and channels to increase cov-
erage and reduce interference. Characterizing such net-
works can be difficult with statically-configured sniffers.
A network measurement infrastructure should adjust dy-
namically so as to continue to collect relevant data from
the network, and an appropriate sampling strategy might
be one that focuses on APs’ currently-assigned channels.
D. Deployment
Wireless monitoring is useful in the deployment stage
of a wireless network, in the “site survey”, where AP den-
sity requirements are determined. But monitoring is also
useful in the post-deployment phase, where sanity checks
may need to be performed. For instance, it may be nec-
essary to determine that the correct number of APs have
been deployed, or that their channel assignment is cor-
rect. Channel-sampling sniffers could be useful for this
purpose.
Post-deployment measurement could also be used for
capacity planning, e.g., for noticing hotspots that indicate
a need to deploy additional APs. In such a case a Propor-
tional/Time/Client Count channel strategy might be ap-
propriate.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAMPLING STRATEGY
Any sampling strategy needs to be dynamic to meet
the needs of the changing wireless network environment.
There may be situations that require closer monitoring on
some channels than others. For example, after detecting
an attacker on a particular channel, that particular channel
might need to be monitored more closely.
We propose a strategy for determining sampling time
intervals based on Frame Counts, that is, a Propor-
tional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy. Let n be the
number of channels and T be the time for one complete
sampling cycle, where a cycle is a period of time in which
we visit each channel once. Let fi, j be the number of
frames captured on channel i in the cycle j and ti, j be the
time spent on channel i in cycle j.
Assume that the first cycle is an equal-time cycle with
the radio spending ti,1 = T/n time on each channel. At
the end of the first cycle, the { fi,1} contains the number
of frames captured on each channel in the first cycle.
The time to be spent on channel i in the next cycle j+1
is based on the proportions observed during cycle j:
ti, j+1 =
( fi, j/ti, j)
∑ni=1( fi, j/ti, j)
×T
This equation calculates the proportion of frames per
unit time that are captured on channel i in iteration j. That
ratio is multiplied by the total time T so that the time ti, j+1
spent on channel i in the next iteration is in the same pro-
portion.
We call the period that the sniffer spends on one chan-
nel an interval. It is important to not allow any channel’s
interval to become too small to capture a frame because
then fi, j = 0 and all future intervals for channel i will be
zero. In our implementation we limit the minimum in-
terval size M. If the proportion allocated to a particular
channel is less than the minimum interval, we spend more
than time T for the next cycle.
The cycle time T is an important feature. If T is short,
correspondingly, the intervals will be small. Each change
in channel introduces some overhead with respect to time.
If intervals are small the channel switching overhead is
significant, but the method reacts quickly to changes in
traffic load. If, however, the cycle time is 10sec, the phe-
nomenon might have ended before the correct channel is
sampled again.
Therefore, longer cycle times are useful if efficiency
is important for an application. Shorter cycle times are
recommended, however, if quick reactivity is important.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented the strategy described above to
validate our hypothesis that through the use of smart sam-
pling strategies we can obtain better data by some mea-
sure. The measure or metric is dependent on the applica-
tion. In this section, we look at two applications. First, we
describe a characterization application in which a higher
number of frames captured is better than a fewer number
of frames. Second, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
application where a greater number of intrusion alerts is
better.
A. Characterization experiment
A.1 Testbed
Our testbed consists of two Intel x86 sniffers with
Atheros-based wireless cards. The sniffers ran Linux (Fe-
dora Core 4 with kernel 2.6.14 and the MadWiFi driver)
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for our experiments. The two sniffers were placed 90 cm
apart in a research lab that had a crowded radio environ-
ment with several 802.11 experiments in progress at any
given time.
A.2 Experiment
We sniffed the 11 legal channels using the Equal/Time/Time
sampling strategy on one sniffer. On another snif-
fer, we simultaneously sniffed using the Propor-
tional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy. We experi-
mented with various cycle times T = {1.1 sec, 2.2 sec,
. . . , 22 sec}. Each of these experiments was run for 10
minutes. The whole process was then repeated, swapping
the strategy assignment to sniffer to discount for radio-
propagation differences.
A.3 Results
We plot the distribution of time on each channel and
the distribution of the count of frames captured on each
channel.
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Fig. 1. Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy (T = 11 sec).
Figure 1 shows the number of frames captured on each
channel using the Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy.
We observe that the Frame Counts varied across channels.
This example is one of 20 runs, all of which were similar
except for one case described below.
Figure 2 shows that the time spent on each channel was
close to being equal. The slight differences in the heights
of the columns are due to a lag between our measurement
and the time the channel was actually changed.
Figure 3 shows the traffic captured using the Propor-
tional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy. Note that
the peaks (highest frame counts) are higher than in the
case of the Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy because
the more active channels are allocated more time in the
Proportional/Time/Frame Count strategy.
In one of the runs (Figure 5), we observed a huge
spike on channel 8. On further investigation we deter-
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Fig. 2. Confirming equal time spent on each channel (T = 11sec).
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Fig. 3. Traffic Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy (T =
11sec)
mined that the data was HTTP traffic from one specific
client. Using the Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy,
about 19 megabytes of traffic was captured in the run that
lasted 10 minutes—about twice the volume as in other
runs. Simultaneously, however, the sniffer running the
Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy (Fig-
ure 7) captured nearly 80 megabytes of data. This volume
was approximately 8 times the volume collected by other
runs of the Proportional/Time/Frame Count strategy. This
observation indicates that the Proportional/Time/Frame
Count sampling strategy is indeed successful in maximiz-
ing the data capture. The Proportional/Time/Frame Count
sampling strategy captured 6 times as many frames on
channel 8 than the Equal/Time/Time strategy.
Figure 8 shows that the Proportional/Time/Frame
Count sampling strategy adapted the time spent on each
channel to the traffic abnormalities while in contrast the
Equal/Time/Time strategy maintained equal proportions
(Figure 6).
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Fig. 4. For Proportional/Time/Frame Count strategy, time spent on each
channel is proportional to traffic observed (T = 11sec)
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Fig. 5. Equal/Time/Time strategy: Huge traffic spike on channel 8 (T
= 3.3 sec.) Note that the scale of the Y-axis is different from the
previous plots. Compare this figure to Figure 7.
B. IDS Experiment
As described in section III-A, one use of sampling is
for detecting security breaches in wireless networks. In
the case of denial-of-service attacks, a malicious attacker
may be motivated to disrupt as much traffic as possible.
To achieve this goal, the attacker will need to monitor
the channels to determine which channel has the highest
load. Once this channel is determined, the attack can be
launched on that channel.
To determine the effectiveness of our system in such a
scenario, we mimicked this attack strategy. We periodi-
cally measured the traffic on each channel and launched
an attack on the channel with the highest number of
frames. Each attack was of random length (between 0
and 12 seconds) with intervals of random length (between
5 and 12 seconds) between each attack.
We used a Linux laptop as the attacker’s machine, run-
ning the Auditor distribution of Linux. We ran the deau-
thentication attack file2air, which spoofs the MAC ad-
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Fig. 6. Equal/Time/Time strategy: Time spent on each channel was
approximately the same (T = 3.3sec)
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Fig. 7. The Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy accentu-
ates the spike in traffic volume (T = 3.3sec)
dress of an AP and sends flood of deauthenticaton mes-
sages to a victim so as to deny service. We configured
file2air to send a flood of deauthentication frames with
interframe intervals of 1 millisecond.
We sampled the 11 802.11b/g channels using the Pro-
portional/Time/Frame Count and the Equal/Time/Time
sampling strategies. To detect the attack, we ran the popu-
lar IDS tool snort-wireless [3] on the traces captured using
the two sampling strategies.
We observe that snort-wireless detects a greater num-
ber of abnormal sequence number gaps (which indicate
MAC spoofing) in the traces collected from the Pro-
portional/Time/Frame Count (Figure 9) strategy than the
Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy.2 Snort-wireless also
generates more alerts (Figure 10) in the Proportional-
Time Frame Count trace. This indicates that the Propor-
tional/Time/Frame Count strategy captured more attack
instances than the Equal/Time/Time sampling strategy. A
2Note that snort-wireless only flags a deauth attack alert on spoofed
deauthentication frames, rather than legitimate deauthentications.
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Fig. 8. Time spent on channel 8 was much more than the other channels
as the sampling strategy adjusted (T = 3.3sec). Note that the scale
of the Y-axis for this plot is different from previous time plots.
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Fig. 9. Number of abnormal sequence number gaps detected by snort-
wireless. snort-wireless detects more abnormal sequence number
gaps in the trace captured by the Proportional/Time/Frame Count
sampling strategy than the Equal/Time/Time strategy.
paired t-test indicates that the two strategies perform dif-
ferently at the 1% level.
Figures 9 and 10 show the outcome of our experiments,
with total cycle times varying from 1.1 seconds to 3.1 sec-
onds, and a minimum interval time of 0.5 seconds in each
run. Although there is no trend over the increasing cycle
times, snort-wireless consistently detects a greater num-
ber of abnormal sequence number gaps and flags more
alerts in the the Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling
strategy than the Equal/Time/Time strategy. Our expecta-
tion that more attacks would be detected using smart sam-
pling was therefore correct.
VI. RELATED WORK
We mention above some of the many wireless network
characterization studies [5], [15], [10] that use wired-
side methods to monitor wireless networks. Wireless-
side characterization studies are less common, and are
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Fig. 10. Number of Alerts flagged by snort-wireless. snort-
wireless consistently flags more alerts in the trace captured us-
ing the Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy than the
Equal/Time/Time strategy
typically concerned with only measuring the channels on
which APs are assigned [11], [14], [17].
We are unaware of any work that looks at channel-
sampling or channel-hopping strategies. The popular
“war driving” tool, Kismet [1], includes configuration op-
tions for channel-hopping sequences and channel-dwell
times (channel intervals). The interval times are config-
ured statically, however.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have discussed the motivation for
smart channel-sampling strategies, and experimented
with a Proportional/Time/Frame Count sampling strategy
that spends more time on channels with higher observed
frame rates.
The ideas presented in this paper are still at a prelim-
inary stage. There are many sampling strategies that re-
main to be explored. In the near term, we intend to inte-
grate the channel sampling system into a monitoring sys-
tem for an infrastructure wireless network. We plan to im-
plement more sampling strategies and explore their use-
fulness. We are also considering active sampling strate-
gies that dynamically alter their parameters (such as cycle
time) depending on the observed traffic, and introducing
randomization in channel-hopping sequences and inter-
vals in order to detect an elusive attacker hiding in lesser
utilized channels.
A property of 802.11 networks we intend to exploit is
cross-channel interference. Due to channel overlap, even
if a radio is on a particular channel, signals from adjacent
channels can be observed [13]. Sampling can be opti-
mized by using these leakage signals from other channels.
Ideally, we will not need to hop to some channels nearly
as often.
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